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On the dynamics of culture1
Juri Lotman
One of the primary presumptions of semiotics is the existence of pre- or extra-
semiotic space, against which the basic concepts of semiotics are defined. This 
approach is entirely warranted as a heuristic. The error lies not in this presumption 
itself, but in a confusion of principles: it leads us to perceive logical convention as 
empirical reality.
One such logical convention is the proposition of the existence of a certain initial 
point, a relative zero, in dynamic processes. We are never confronted by the “zero 
state” in empirical reality. So we have constructed a model of cultural dynamics 
which begins from a point of “semiotic zero”, whose place coincides with the animal 
world (in spite of the capabilities of an already highly developed zoosemiotics). This 
transfers the zero from the realm of heuristic convention into our conception of 
reality: “conventional zero” conceals in itself a creation myth. When a chronicler 
says: “and the ancients lived in a bestial manner, behaving like swine. They murdered 
each other, engaged in all uncleanliness, and there was no marriage among them,” he 
is introducing an initial “zero point,” an initial state declared to possess no indication 
of order). What follows is a process of organization. Such a point of view, equally 
mythological in its essence, derives from a hypothesized dichotomy between 
language and speech.
The actual historical process may be described as diametrically opposed: it is 
in fact the earlier stages that appear to have a more rigid organization; here one can 
compare the still prevailing attitude towards zoosemiotics with already discarded 
views on the behavior of “savages”. At a point not historically distant from our 
own, the “savage” was described as free from all limitation, following an instinctual 
“animal” pattern of behavior, whereas subsequent development took the form of 
an introduction of a system of “regularity” into this chaos of individual drives; for 
example, the replacement of promiscuity by a system of moral rules.
The study of the behavior of the higher animals paints for us a starkly contrasting 
picture – one of rigid organization. The key moments of life – mating, the rearing 
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of young, hunting, the evaluation of a situation and the appropriate response to 
it – are strictly ritualized. However, it is important to emphasize that ritual itself 
possesses a unique character. The organization of memory plays a fundamental role 
in ritual, and ritual serves as a mechanism for initiating the individual into group 
memory. Therefore, outside the human world, ritual creates a system of constant 
organization, excluding or highly limiting further development. Ritual removes the 
individual’s freedom to engage in individual behavior while strictly predetermining 
behavior in general. In this sense, a characteristic example would be a situation 
where an animal in nature is removed from the normal conditions of its behavior 
(for example, a predator which has been separated from its pack or removed from 
its natural habitat). Hunters speak about such a predator as being particularly 
dangerous because of its unpredictable behavior (“to behave like one is rabid”). 
But such unmotivated, dangerous behavior might also be described from a different 
point of view: though representing a degradation from ritual, it entails a sharp rise in 
unpredictability and represents a dynamic moment in which the role of individual 
behavior explosively increases.
The shift from the cyclical repetition of collective behavior, which maintains a 
strict sign structure, to the disorder of unpredictable behavior (possibly the result 
of a catastrophe severely disrupting the entire structure of the species’ situation) 
can be viewed as a moment of change from cyclical to historical development (the 
conception of “moment” here is, of course, relative: we are talking about a process 
with a gigantic chronological scope).
The historical process, supplanting cyclical change, led to the formation of an 
ongoing conflict between repetition and internally dynamic forms of behavior. 
At certain critical points dynamic processes became unpredictable; however the 
processes of stabilization replacing them remain highly predictable2 and, what 
is more, extremely limited in their range of possibilities. This dual nature of the 
dynamic process means that human history, depending as it does on the selection 
of a language of description, appears both to repeat one and the same structure and 
to have an unpredictable nature. In this manner, it makes sense to distinguish the 
cyclical and linear forms of dynamics; we may divide the latter into a gradual form 
of dynamics that arises through consolidated laws and is consequently marked by 
great predictability, and a catastrophic dynamic, with drastically less predictability. 
From the point of view of these two forms of development, the dynamic of regular 
repetitions is experienced as a stasis. For example, Plato described the state of 
organized change of stabilized forms as static in his stylized image of Egypt. 
2 Cf. the concept of bifurcation points in dynamic processes (I. Prigogine). [Th is and further 
footnotes from original.]
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The situation is more complex in the real historical process, where we never 
encounter a uniform, sequential, rhythmic alternation of dynamic (catastrophic) 
stages of development and subsequent “normalized” stages. In actual history 
many dynamic yet non-synchronized processes, developing at different rates, exist 
alongside chronologically simultaneous processes, surviving the period of stability 
in other spheres of development. Thus, for example, tempestuous developments 
and explosions in a given sphere of science may not be chronologically or causally 
connected with corresponding explosive movements in the various spheres of 
everyday life. An explosive state in art may be synchronous with stability in the 
political sphere. However, during a particularly tempestuous outbreak of individual 
explosive periods, these explosive periods may impose their language on other 
processes, and as a tendency, on all dynamic processes. Thus, during the socio-
political explosion of the great French revolution of the 18th century, the terms 
of socio-political revolution were used to describe explosive processes in the most 
diverse spheres. In this case, the naming of processes exerts an opposite influence on 
the character of their development.
Self-naming, like all sorts of naming, often defines both a type of given behavior 
and its historic fate. So, the terms “Bolsheviks” or “Mensheviks” owe their historical 
origins to a relatively chance distribution of votes at the second gathering of the 
RSD party; subsequently, however, these terms largely described the real historic 
fates of these two parties. The term “Bolsheviks” created an image of massiveness 
and power and appealed to the broad workers’ circles – the term “Mensheviks” 
concealed within itself the semantics of victimhood and selectivity, which clearly 
aimed at appealing to the intelligentsia. 
This in part proves the magic of naming – from the Latin “nomina sunt omena” 
to the fate of Gogol’s character Bashmachkin. Akaky Akakyevich receives along 
with his name a dual fate: both through the Greek meaning of the word (“mild”) 
and through its Russian folk etymology. By emphasizing that the hero could not be 
named otherwise, Gogol accentuates the name’s ominous character.
Cases like the latter are usually attributed to the magic of naming; they have, 
however, a much deeper meaning, revealing the real involvement of naming with 
practice. The naming of reality changes its essence and the nature of its behavior.
From the above it follows that real historical processes are multifaceted and 
polyfunctional and consequently may be described variously from various points 
of view. However, in the following, we will consider, for the sake of simplicity, only 
the development patterns of the dominant structures of this or that process, having 
specified beforehand that in real historical movement they are all invariably affected 
by  various secondary explosions and “explosive waves” from previous stages.
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As was already mentioned, in pre-human culture (in this case, the culture of 
higher animals) species memory predominates. Conventional behavior is a way 
to preserve expedient experience in the life of the species or group, and properly 
repeats in established forms. In the shift from a cyclical scheme of motion to a 
linear dynamic, the choice of potential behaviors expanded drastically. This would 
have led other animals to perceive the early form of man as an “insane” creature.  A 
“normal” animal would not be able to predict its behavior, just as it is impossible to 
predict the behavior of a madman, whose consciousness has rejected the majority of 
a healthy person’s inhibitions.3
This situation resembles one of the conflicts from R. Kipling’s The Jungle 
Book. The regular, “rational” behavior of the animal heroes – the characters of the 
book – is here opposed to the mindless and unpredictable actions of the Bandar-
log (monkeys) and their feigned organization. One might propose that this is 
precisely how the behavior of early man would have appeared to the first animals 
who encountered him. This unpredictability, that is to say, the fact that man had 
much more freedom at his disposal than his adversaries, limited as they were to a 
relatively small collection of behaviors (gestures), placed man in an advantageous 
position that more than adequately made up for his relative helplessness vis-à-vis 
other animals. Kipling astutely observed the world of animals observing “proto-
man”:  animals see “proto-man’ not only as insane but immoral, as carrying out a 
“war without rules.”
A similar situation will recur: the man of the Renaissance from the point of view 
of people living in the more strictly organized (less dynamic) Middle Ages, will 
seem to violate rules and achieve victory by prohibited means, comporting himself 
“inhumanly.” The collective immersed in a previous stage of linear development 
subjectively experiences the undermining of behavioral norms – an unavoidable 
condition of progress – as not only madness, but moral degradation. This explains 
the frequent assertions throughout the history of culture that animals are more moral 
than people. The breakthrough into new, broader systems of rules is experienced as a 
movement from a world of rules into a realm of unlimited freedom. Man, the “mad” 
creature (from the point of view of the animal world) turned out to be exclusively 
a result of his particular point of view. As his enemies from the animal world could 
not predict man’s behavior, their opposition to him suddenly lost its effectiveness.4
3 A similar case, albeit in an immeasurably lesser degree, is when an animal enters into a 
situation profoundly anomalous for it, for example, a geological catastrophe. But whereas the 
stable behavior of the animal comes into confl ict with the altered world, the madman’s profoundly 
altered behavior widens confl icts with the stable world.
4 Th e dynamics of human behavior, in turn, profoundly refashioned animal behavior. It is a 
mistake to think that animals of the Stone Age behaved in the same way as their descendants (our 
contemporaries). Th ey were considerably more defenseless. Th e current behavior of animals 
would also seem “mad” to them, since many of its features are dictated by contacts with man.
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However, these new potentialities required reinforcement, and here it became 
obvious that the departure of behavior from the preceding realm of predictability 
led not to unlimited possibilities – that is, to chaos – but to a new, organized 
construction (that is, one having its own expanded boundaries). As this new 
experience had to be transmitted through successive generations, it rapidly acquired 
a conventional, evidently gestural character. Expedient nonhereditary behavior 
was reinforced in a system of movements that was unchanging for the collective. 
This effective, expedient behaviour was reinforced and transmitted thanks to its 
transformation into proto-ritual. Contrary to popular opinion, man at this stage 
would not have been a “savage”, doing “whatever he pleases”, but a creature with 
maximally “ritualized” behavior.
Thus, at the beginning of human culture lay a great explosion, perhaps of a 
catastrophic nature. This was followed by a stage in which the results of the explosive 
moment were reinforced. 
The drastically distinctive feature of this new dynamic of behavior was that, while 
superimposed on biological memory and hence linked with the pre-human stage of 
evolution, it simultaneously featured a continual increase in the role of individual 
experience. In the animal world, periods of ritualized behavior are introduced 
into the memory of the species. “Free”, that is to say individual, behavior only 
encompasses secondary aspects of life and is not recorded by the memory of the 
species. What is beneficial is reinforced in the collective, while what is chance and 
individual is consigned to oblivion. In human society the regular and the random 
have changed positions: unpredictable behavior assumed the important role as 
the generator of new possibilities. This generator became linked with individual 
actions and expanded the range of freedom. The opposing mechanism – collective 
in nature – evaluated and included some of these individual actions in the memory 
of general behavior, erasing others.
At moments of bifurcation, the instability of boundaries results in an explosion 
of new forms of behavior. During a period of slowed development, the new forms 
of behavior which turn out to be expediently warranted are selected and reinforced.
In this manner, chance outbreaks are transformed into behavior. The selection 
process reinforces and transmits to succeeding generations those actions which, 
having arisen in the explosive period, receive a specific impetus.
The task of preserving individual experience required new and significantly 
more complicated memory functions. From all of the multifarious, often chance 
types of behavior, expedience selected, and memory preserved and transmitted, a 
relatively limited series of those which made sense. This took place in two stages: in 
the first stage, new possibilities for behavior increased unpredictably at bifurcation 
moments, while in the second stage (during periods of slowed development) the 
most expedient variants were selected. This leads to an important conclusion: at 
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the earliest stage the choice of forms of behavior was not creative in nature, that 
is, it was governed by certain rules (the role of chance was consequently limited). 
The reinforcement of selected expedient gestures and actions also demanded 
ritualization: a conventional system of movements, cries and musical howls 
enabled memorization. The need to transmit non-hereditary actions required its 
combination with certain forms of proto-art.
The idea that human activity in the early stages of its development was practical 
in our sense of the word – that is, opposed to an emotionally “artistic” principle – 
is supported neither by the material we have at our disposal nor by theoretical 
considerations. Precisely at this stage, the task of reinforcing experience demanded 
mnemonic mechanisms not possessed by man. The completely new need to preserve 
a continually growing reserve of non-hereditary knowledge gave rise to an apparatus 
for memorization that was artistic in nature. This was not a human invention: one 
could cite the famous example of how the bee transmits non-hereditary information 
by translating it into the conventional language of “dance”.  Of course, the relative 
stability of the knowledge being transmitted allows bees to limit themselves to the 
hereditary and relatively restricted system of “dance”, whereas the open nature of 
human information requires a significantly richer and more dynamic mechanism.
Thus, even at the earliest stages of human behavior, about which we can only 
speculate (as is well known, everything that can be observed, even among the most 
“primitive” peoples, either belongs to a considerably later period or is the result of 
secondary simplification), we may hypothetically delimit two tendencies which, 
though opposing, are similar in structure. The first tendency is the expansion of 
possibilities for gestural behavior and the creation of new types of ritualization; 
the second tendency is the limitation and selection of variants, a reinforcement of 
variants in collective memory which is associated with the increased stricture of 
ritual. In both cases, however, a ritual is not separated from a practical act nor does 
it oppose it; rather it is a language in which a practical act assumes the function of 
social behavior. Therefore, the system of conscious actions in the archaic epoch was 
considerably more rigid than at later stages. Just as people at early stages of written 
culture prohibit the superfluous use of written script but nonetheless ascribe it both 
a ritualized sacral function and a practical role in life, so too did man, for whom 
behavior as a whole (gesture, vocalization etc.) had acquired meaning, prohibit 
the superfluous use of these means; they were simultaneously action, memory 
and myth.
The following stage was associated with the separation of the practical from 
the mythological spheres of life. The practical sphere gained significantly greater 
freedom, that is, it was translated into a language with significantly more elements 
and more possibilities for their combination, a language with so much more diversity 
 On the dynamics of culture 361
that it could survive subjectively as a non-language, that is, as an unorganized 
sphere. The area of mythological language narrowed and became markedly more 
structured in nature. At this stage, semiotic comprehension and practical behavior 
were still identified with one another or were closely intertwined. However, within 
this system a differentiation begins to appear between actions having meaning and 
meanings corresponding to actions: between an action that signifies something and 
a meaning that is realized as an action. 
The distinction between these aspects subsequently acquired a profound signi-
ficance. Action gave rise to the perception of distinct forms of cultural behaviors 
as bearers of certain semantics. On this basis, for example, practical eating became 
separated from sacral eating – while one became deritualized, the ritual character 
of the other became emphasized. However, both instances of eating retained not a 
symbolic, but a gastronomical nature. The physical experience of food constituted 
an integral part of ritual eating as well. Eating must have been accompanied by 
the joy that follows physically satiating hunger. The acquisition of richer, fattier, 
more delicious food was to a large degree linked with the inseparable comingling 
of the magical function and physical satisfaction. In precisely this manner, the 
gestures, howls, exclamations and laugher that emphasized happiness also had 
a magical character, but were not a game. They were products of sincere, direct 
emotions which an outside observer would have incorrectly perceived as chaotic. 
Furthermore, the physical side of eating acquired a secondary, ritual character which 
has been described by M. Bakhtin and a whole series of ethnographers. Bakhtin 
interpreted this system as an invasion of freedom into the sphere of ritual limitation; 
however he himself demonstrated that this very “freedom” was realized in ritualized 
forms. In this manner, subjective deritualization leads to a redoubling of ritual. The 
subsequent intensification of the magical function of eating, as with other physical 
processes, led to a serious redistribution of emphasis.
If, as has been noted, eating was initially (in a logical sense, as it is difficult to 
speak of any concrete historical evidence) the content of an as yet unformed ritual, 
it later became a sign, a ritual form. On one hand, this expanded eating’s sphere 
of content. Not only the satisfaction of hunger, but also the entire complex of 
positive emotions and meanings (the conclusion of peace treaties, the entire sum 
of marriage rituals, etc.) could take the form of the ritual consumption of food. The 
feast becomes a universal form of ritual, possessing a broad, positive meaning. It is 
a ritualized expression available for simultaneous use with a wide range of contents. 
Even emotions, whose physical foundation becomes more and more significantly 
ritualized, become more intense in nature. Ritual gestures like the expression of joy 
at a feast lend a significant character to behavior as a whole. The need arises to learn 
merry and tragic behaviors, as well as the ability to distinguish and understand them 
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(cf. the folk tale about the fool who cries at a feast and laughs at a funeral:5 here the 
“fool” is a person who lacks command over a shared language of behavior). The 
realm of expression also expands: food may be replaced by a symbol of food, while 
bloody, carnivorous eating may be replaced by vegetarian eating. A complicated and 
highly diverse system of substitutions develops, in which past content transforms 
into an expression, a sign.
In this manner, a pagan priest or other sacred person is replaced in the sacrifice 
by his temporary substitute – another person, such as the member of another tribe, 
a slave, a general “other.” And since the “other” is perceived as “not a full person” (in 
many languages the word for person and the tribal endonym are synonyms), then 
the next step is the replacement of the sacrificed man by a sacred animal. Semiosis 
becomes more complicated in the process: the slain and, in the complete ritual, 
eaten priest signifies God, and the substituted slave in turn represents the priest 
(and consequently, God as well). Initially the eaten ritual animal also signifies God. 
Only later does the sacrifice by God replace the sacrifice to God. The mechanism of 
replacement itself, however, is constant, right up to the Communion of Christianity – 
first the Last Supper (“And as they did eat, Jesus took bread, and blessed, and brake 
it, and gave to them, and said, Take, eat: this is my body. And he took the cup, and 
when he had given thanks, he gave it to them: and they all drank of it. And he said 
unto them, This is my blood”. – Mar 14: 22–24), and then the Eucharist with its 
complete replacement of the sacrifice by bread and wine (the Host). In this manner 
the Last Supper is not simply a prediction of the crucifixion, as it is rationalized by 
later thinking, but is rather the crucifixion itself, simply in a different language.
Later ways of thinking found this type of substitution difficult to grasp, giving 
rise to narratives which perceived a play on words where initially there had been one 
signified in different symbolic systems. Later rational thinking tends to simplify this 
mythological unity. An example of this is the Roman practice of deceiving the gods. 
The Romans promise a divinity a certain quantity of heads (it is understood that the 
god prefers the heads of livestock) and after the successful completion of business, 
the god is presented with the heads of poppies. The perception of the episode as 
a play on words and a deception is, of course, a later interpretation of an earlier 
mythological equivalency between a figurative sacrifice and a commercial exchange 
of things of equal values. Here Roman juridical thinking translated mythology into 
a language of its own.
A correspondence may also be postulated between the physiological and the 
semiotic in the perception of sexual relations. This perception has undergone a 
5  One must diff erentiate this from cases in which a lack of correspondence between behavior 
and its interpretation is ritualized, for example, ritual laughter at funerals and wakes or the ritual 
weeping of the bride in the wedding ceremony.
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no less complex evolution. At certain stages of their development, sexual relations 
were semiotically indistinguishable from eating, being part of a larger image of 
abundance translatable into a more general language (the limitation and ultimate 
removal of proscriptions). At other historical moments, the physical side of sexual 
relations was able to become highly semioticized.  Thus, the ritual of courtly love 
included a degree of opposition between quotidian and significant aspects, which 
in principle excluded the possibility of sexual relations (the veneration of the Holy 
Virgin as an object of courtly love). At the same time, the physical act, for example, 
the rape of peasant girl by a knight, in principle was not translated into the language 
of love. The behavior of youth in the second half of our century could be considered 
a diametrically opposed behavioral system, one which translates sexual relations 
into the sphere of the “habitual”, the “everyday”, and separates it from the behavior 
of love or the family. The stage at which action corresponds to speech is replaced by 
a tendency towards the separation of action and speech.
A principally new stage in the formation of culture is related to the appearance 
of conventional signs, completely separated from the object they signified. 
This profound revolution created speech as we conceive it. Of course, verbal 
communication appeared considerably earlier, but at a time when a word could 
not be separated from the object it signified; it performed precisely the same role 
that gesture does in modern communication, that is, the role of an accompaniment, 
a reinforcer of meaning, a carrier of nuance; the basic semantics of these forms 
remained at the level of the signified object or gesture. Jonathan Swift demonstrated 
the possibility of such a paradoxical language when he described one of the languages 
of Laputa as being characterized by the inhabitants carrying around a large number 
of objects and pointing to them in place of words.  Here, the object was the expression, 
whereas the word was its content. This language, despite its obvious inconvenience, 
would have had one incontrovertible advantage: it excluded the possibility of lying, 
as expression and content were one and the same. The separation of a word from 
an object had innumerable consequences: most immediately, the possibility of lies, 
more remotely, the rise of poetry.
The subsequent history of humanity becomes a history of word usage. If 
previously the dominant role of semiotics in culture had been masked by practice, 
now semiotics (the function and role of speech) becomes the dominant mechanism 
of history. One of the fundamental questions of culture becomes its relation to 
speech. The complexity of this question is magnified by the following circumstance: 
traditional philosophy of history proceeds from the premise that the appearance of 
each new stage entails the complete annihilation of the preceding one. However, 
just as how in biological evolution earlier forms of life do not completely die out  but 
rather evolve and adapt to new conditions, the emergence of new dominant forms 
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in human history and culture does not cause the disappearance of preceding forms. 
Thus the appearance of new civilizations did not cause the disappearance of slavery, 
nor other, earlier economic forms. In equal measure, archaic systems of customs and 
forms of behavior retreat to the periphery, though, as a rule, they exist alongside later 
structures. For example, the possibilities for the dual function of armed combat: in 
the immediate practical sphere as well as in the conventional-semiotic sphere – in 
historical practice they are continually intertwined. As feudal codes of ethics became 
established, a wound inflicted by an enemy acquired a dual significance: along with 
its practical meaning, its symbolic meaning becomes all the more apparent. A wound 
becomes desirable as a sign of bravery (this tradition endures to the present day; 
for example, the famous practice of members of Burschen at German universities of 
lacerating their faces and artificially giving these wounds a terrifying, pronounced 
character: the wound acts as a sign of honor). The semiotics of honor transforms 
everyday concepts, changing the undesirable into the desirable. Simultaneously, its 
real activity is replaced by a figurative representation. Thus, during induction into 
knighthood real bloodshed is gradually replaced by a figurative blow with a sword. 
Along with this there arises the concept of a “wound of honor” – a wound that 
enhances dignity – as well as the concept of the humiliating wound. The first relates 
to dangerous, frontally inflicted wounds; the second relates to wounds inflicted 
from behind without a weapon. The encroachment of conventional-semiotic 
concepts into practical ones was reflected, for example, in the later version of “The 
Russian Truth” – the juridical text of the early Russian Middle Ages, in which blows 
inflicting damage to honor (blows with the flat side of a sword, with the handle and 
those with the back of the hand) demand a higher compensation to the victim than 
physically grievous wounds.
Through a theoretical approach we can arrange the elements of cultural semiotics 
by their degree of complexity in the process of evolution. In reality, however, 
various semiotic structures, from the most primitive to the most complicated, 
exist simultaneously, interweaving with one another. Thus, for example, the duel 
as a distinct semiotic structure represents the intersection, in essence, of various 
mechanisms. Even its relation to physical confrontation (brawling) is no longer 
unambiguous. The famous duelist F. I. Tolstoy (the American), according to 
Vyazemsky, used the relation of the duel to fistycuffs to his advantage in the following 
manner: “Prince *** owed Tolstoy a rather considerable sum through a promissory 
note. The deadline of payment had long ago elapsed, and extensions had been given, 
but the prince still did not pay him the money. Finally Tolstoy, having lost patience, 
wrote to him: if you do not pay your debt in full by such and such date, then I will not 
go and seek justice in the courts, but will address myself directly to your highness’s 
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head”.6  Here before us is a multistage pun. “To address oneself to the head” is a 
bureaucratic expression meaning “to complain directly to the management” – at the 
same time, in Tolstoy’s  letter it also signifies an insult accompanying a challenge to 
a duel (in real practice, a slap signifying an insult is, as a rule, replaced by the sign 
of a slap in the face: by a threatening gesture, the throwing down of a glove, or a 
verbal insult ). Tolstoy-the-American, however, 7 threatens the offender in another 
way as well; he threatens that he – having broken out from the semiotic sphere into 
practical behavior – will simply beat the offender up – “giving him one in the mug” 
(the expression “to give someone one in the mug” is a ritual refusal of ritual. It is no 
coincidence that the Master in Bulgakov’s novel, speaking from the non-ritual point 
of view of the “mad man”, first demands an explanation of whether his offender has 
a mug or a face. “To give someone one in the mug” or “to give someone a slap in the 
face” are not synonyms in the language of behavior but rather antonyms). In this 
manner, F. Tolstoy’s pun “to address oneself to the head” belongs simultaneously to 
bureaucratic language, ritual gesture, and anti-ritual practice.
The duel creates a situation directly opposed to a brawl. The threat of physical pain 
is entirely eliminated and is replaced by combinations of related elements: “life” – 
“death”, “infliction of insult” – “removal of insult”; in other words, material harm is 
replaced by the semiotics of honor. The first result of this is the need for equality. 
A duel is possible only between equals. The age or social status of the participants 
must be equal: Pushkin’s impudent speech directed at M. Orlov in Kishinev could 
not have led to a duel, not only because of the latter’s magnanimity, but also because 
the status of the general, a commander of division who had shed blood at war and 
had been afforded honors, and that of the exiled novice poet were too disparate. 
Orlov could choose not to pursue a duel without any harm to his dignity. Bulgarin’s 
refusal to duel with Del’vig is a similar situation. Bulgarin got out of it with a pointed 
remark: “Tell the baron that I have seen more blood than he has seen ink”. Pushkin 
noted this down as an example of pointed and quick-witted speech rather than a 
cowardly avoidance of danger. A duel between the former Napoleonic officer and 
the nearsighted Petersburg poet could be refused without any loss of honor by the 
6 Vyazemsky, P. 1929. Staraya zapisnaya kniga. Leningrad, p. 70.
7 A glove or playing card could be fl ung into someone’s face as a symbolic slap, or could be 
thrown on the fl oor – as a sign of a sign. O. Mandelstam, challenging A. N. Tolstoy to a duel, 
simply touched his palm to his cheek. Stenich (according to E. M. Tager), who described 
this episode, saw in it only a comic incongruence between Mandelstam’s cast of mind and a 
“chivalrous” situation. It is probable that he is not correct and Mandelstam’s behavior constituted 
an exceptionally subtle form of insult: the resemblance to a brawl, insofar as it was naturally 
understood by A. N. Tolstoy, was entirely eliminated and changed into the insulting gesture of 
touching the face.
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one possessing the clear advantage. Equally, a duel between a nobleman and a non-
noble intellectual was impossible. Herein lies the grotesque comedy of Bazarov’s 
duel with Pavel Petrovich Kirsanov. It is known that the poet Voiture was a reckless 
duelist precisely because he suffered from the inferiority complex of the non-noble 
intellectual. Voiture was refused a duel by his insulter, who simply ordered his 
footmen to beat the brazen young intellectual with sticks.
In this manner, the duel unites the threat of death with a confirmation of the 
participants’ social equality, thereby introducing the insulted person into the 
semiotic space of nobility. Let us compare the epithets: “to ready an honorable 
grave at a noble distance” (Eugene Onegin). The material side of the duel is always 
associated with a certain hierarchy of concepts, conventional by their very nature. 
The duel is a ritual for removing insult and restoring honor. All one has to do is 
destroy the semiotics of these two phenomena and the duel transforms into murder. 
The conventional character of the duel also determines the semiotic convention of 
compensation. If a person competent in questions of honor recognizes that an insult 
lacks a fatal character, then the element of real conflict may gradually weaken, while 
the hierarchy of conventional semiotics will expand. The restoration of honor may 
take the form of a conventional spilling of blood (if only an insignificant drop), an 
exchange of gunfire. The latter is also ritual in nature: even in the absence of blood-
thirsty intentions, a demonstration of peaceability is only permitted in certain forms. 
The semiotics of gesture plays a role here. Thus, for example, a shot into the air 
should not be too overt (the position of the first shooter is particularly sensitive in 
this regard, in that, by shooting into the air, he effectively compels his opponent to 
restrain his behavior as well, depriving him of the freedom of choice). An overt shot 
in the air, especially by the first shooter, may be understood as an offensive gesture 
of disdain. It was precisely this which enraged Martynov and provoked his blood-
thirsty behavior during his duel with Lermontov. The upper limit of conventionality 
was the replacement of the duel by gestures in a conventional situation, the exchange 
of conventional formulas of usage or equally conventional forms of duelist behavior. 
Thus, for example, the duel between Griboyedov and Yakubovich lacked any real 
cause: neither of the participants had been insulted and neither had any justification 
for desiring bloodshed. They should have exchanged shots only as participants 
in a renowned fourfold duel where they acted as seconds. Here, however, the 
encroachment of direct emotion (resentment, animosity) into ritual nearly caused 
the duel to end in tragedy.
The semiotic aspect of culture has a contradictory structure. One of its tendencies 
is associated with the multiplication of various languages. The dynamic character of 
the process determines the continual emergence of ever newer sign systems and the 
rearrangement of their positions of dominance. Gestures, singing, dance, and various 
forms of art successively replace one another as leaders of the semiotic process. This 
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process is never monostructural.  Only in a heuristic can one isolate the history of 
literature, painting or some other type of semiotics from its surroundings. In reality, 
movement is realized as a continuous exchange – the perception of alien systems, 
accompanied by their translation into a familiar language. This can be compared with 
the cooperation of groups of instruments in an orchestra. Writing an isolated history 
of a given language – the language of poetry, for example – outside of its surrounding 
context, is the same as removing a single instrument group from an orchestra and 
analyzing it as a whole composition.8 In fact, upon these ideas Y. N. Tynyanov 
based his conception of the dominant role of secondary literary movements and 
the constant alternation of first and second order literature. Tynyanov’s idea –  that 
high poetry is not born of high poetry, but rather originates as an outcast of other 
orders (compare Akhmatova’s lines:  “If only you knew from what rubbish heap/ 
verses grow, knowing no shame”) – may be paraphrased as a thought about how a 
new stage, for example, of literature, is not born from the previous stage without the 
dominating influence of lateral lines. 
The opposite trend is associated with the efforts of each, different tendency to 
seize the dominant position and force its own language on the epoch as a whole. 
Thus, in the Russian and, more broadly, European culture of the second half of the 
19th century the novel became dominant, forcing its language on every form of art 
(it would also be interesting to study the influence of the Russian novel on Russian 
and European philosophy, as well as on the nature and everyday behavior of the 
political struggles of the epoch).  The period of Romanticism was in equal measure 
associated with poetry’s exceptionally broad invasion into political thought and 
everyday life. One could also note the invasion of military, Napoleonic thought into 
various spheres of European consciousness, from politics to art (contemporaries 
stubbornly noted similarities to Napoleon in the persons and figures of Pestel and 
Muravev-Apostol. Pestel and Muravev-Apostol were not similar to each other, and 
the fact that the features of the French emperor were seen in both suggests that 
political role dictated the perception of external appearance and not the other way 
around). For Prince Andrei Bolkonsky in War and Peace, the expression “my Toulon” 
comes to signify an entire life program, whose goal is the attainment of a historical 
role, which Lermontov expressed with the lines:
8 Th is phenomenon is, however, initially bipartite. Similar to how a given human individual 
is both part of a collective and an integrated unit, an individual history of literature or of some 
other artistic area or art as whole may be examined both as part of a cultural conglomeration and 
as a complete likeness of this conglomeration.
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I was born so that the whole world would bear witness
To my triumph or downfall.
A principally new function of language was connected with a highly developed 
process of alienation. The separation of language from deed reduced activity to 
gesture. If, at the outset of language, speech had been inseparable from action and 
comprised a part of it, then language had now become self-sufficient and verbal 
language and gesture (deed) could become separate from each other. This drasti-
cally increased the independence of the semantics of speech. The second aspect 
of the process is the separation of the sign from action and the possibility of self-
sufficient signs. An expression of verbal language’s “liberation” was the possibility 
of lying speech. This became excellent proof that language had attained an entirely 
new degree of freedom.
The tendency of speech towards stable forms, towards fixation in non-modifiable 
texts on one side, and towards increasing freedom in the combination of elements 
of speech on the other constitute two opposing tendencies, the dynamic conflict 
between which lies at the foundation of the entire process.
One may suppose that the initial function of speech was connected, on one 
hand, with magic, and with the establishment of repeated gestures in complex 
aspects of behavior on the other. Such a type of speech should have been inclined 
towards stability, towards repeated formulas. It was conservative and, ideally, 
directed towards ossification and sacrilization. The periphery of speech developed 
in the opposite manner. Associated with ritual, it nonetheless preserved great 
freedom. Kipling’s mindless Bandar-log (in contrast to the protagonists – animals 
with ritualized speech) “babble”, that is, they pronounce words whose sense is only 
loosely associated with a concept. Such “babbling” may have also prevailed outside 
the confines of ritual. And precisely here, outside of the boundaries of ritual, verbal 
speech received a degree of freedom which allowed for the formation of verbal art. 
Non-sacral poetry required a degree of freedom of speech which could only arise in 
play – a type of behavior that is principally opposed to the sacral. 
This new, significantly more dynamic structure, as it entered the sacral world 
from outside – from the world of play, drunkenness and permissiveness (for a deep 
analysis of this aspect of history, see the works of M. Bakhtin), reaching its apogee, 
became sacralized itself. Thus, Dionysus, surrounded by a crowd of his divinely 
mad companions, intruded into the orderly world of the Greek gods, entering into 
a competition with Apollo. Before us is a complete cycle: a structure, anti-sacral 
by its very nature and positioned on the periphery of culture, enters into one-on-
one combat with its sacralized centre, thereby hoping, in the future, to squeeze it 
out and occupy its place. This could be compared with the Renaissance, when a 
desacrilization of culture took place within the borders of Catholic states, thereby 
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provoking a dramatic dialogue between sacrilized and non-sacrilized forms of 
culture and art. This dialogue, so it would seem, concluded with the global victory 
of profane forms of culture in 18th-century Europe. However, the place of the 
sacral was filled by profane forms of culture which had taken on a sacral function. 
A typical example is Russian literature, which, beginning in the 18th century and 
continuing on through Gogol, Dostoyevsky and L. Tolstoy, took on a function 
which, in medieval culture, possessed a sacral character. Art (primarily literature) 
took on a religious-ethical function which did not belong to it. In equal measure, it 
spilled over into the sphere of philosophy (engendering the specific character of the 
Russian philosophical school), journalism and took on the universal function of a 
general language of culture.
If previous “action possessing meaning” was replaced by “meaning expressed 
through action”, then, with the increasing dominance of verbal language, a meaning 
may come to expresses another meaning; in other words, all meaning may become 
an expression of some sort of content, which, in turn, may become content of the 
third, fourth and N-th degrees. Medieval mysticism has already demonstrated how 
far the art of many-leveled symbolism can be extended. The resultant semiotic 
structure forms as a tension between two opposing tendencies, the introduction of 
ever newer languages, their quantitative expansion – and their stabilization within a 
limited quantity. Thus, for example, at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th 
centuries the activity of artistic semiotics rapidly developed in spheres which until 
then had been neither artistic nor semiotic. The balagan, the circus, the popular fair 
along with the entire complex of structures they include, the cries of street vendors 
etc. became perceived as arts in their own right. The clearest result of this process 
was the rehabilitation of the cinematographer. At the other end of the cultural 
world, however, traditional forms of art, having become petrified, retreated beyond 
the borders of artistic activity.
 Yet another process was simultaneously underway. The antithesis of speech 
and language, as an antithesis between empirical reality and conventional model, 
contained two potential possibilities. From one point of view it was possible to 
analyze the large and diverse amount of texts actually created by the arts, as well the 
language constructed in the process of their enumeration, as a conventional model. 
In the history of culture, however, we also encounter an opposing view: that the 
most extreme generalization opens the way to reality, with the specific leading into 
the realm of the chance and the readily apparent. This real binarity of the semiotic 
mechanism was reflected in the medieval debate between the nominalists and 
realists.
The two-fold nature of human culture is, to the very depths of its being, 
associated with the conflicting combination of its linear directionality and its 
cyclical repetitiveness. The dual nature of human culture is the real foundation of 
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two semiotic approaches to its history. Culture may be analyzed in its linear dynamic 
as the continual replacement of old structures by new ones, as is the case in the 
traditional study of history. Such a view will illuminate the continuous emergence 
of the new forms which replace and discard the old ones. In the history of culture, 
however, cyclical conceptions have arisen which see the repeating substitution 
of structures as dominant. This question could be resolved by pointing out that 
repetition belongs to the language of culture, while dynamic diversity belongs to 
its speech. However, it has already been emphasized above that the opposition of 
language and speech is only absolute in the conventional process of description. 
In reality, they constantly change places. Both cyclical and dynamic processes are 
equally real. Different types of description will only illuminate different types of 
reality.
Translated by Tyler B. Adkins
